Vulnerability and Future Generations: A Problem of Altruism?
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The present work aims to ask the reasons why, de facto, it is difficult to protect future generations; it would not only be a question of how to safeguard the frail or arrange the protection of the vulnerable, but of trying to provide a moral explanation that fits into the intricate field of intersubjectivity, emphasizing the difficulty of establishing a relational relationship with a You detached from our time and our space: the problem of moral altruism seen from the aspect of mindreading.
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